I should add that, while I'm always a little skeptical of these kinds of mathematical studies, I also love them. I'm skeptical that so much can be reduced to numbers like this; at the same time, I think that personal bias probably comes into it less. So, in the end, probably a wash.
This report is basically an update of one from 2000, where the RAND corporation looked at the likelihood of Chinese success in attacking Taiwan. In 2000, it looked like a cinch for Taiwan. The PLAN did not have the amphibious ships, and the PLAAF and PLANAF didn't have the planes.
Today, however, China still doesn't have the greatest planes, but it does have PLENTY of missiles. Enough, according to these authors, to at least destroy Taiwanese runways, and probably enough to destroy most of the SAMs. This would give China uncontested air superiority, even if the US were to get involved on Taiwan's side.
On the other hand, the real dread scenario of a Chinese amphibious invasion would, very likely, fail miserably, if the Taiwanese set up a proper defense. There are not many places to put ashore on Taiwan, and the Taiwanese military would be able to assemble great numbers of fighters and anti-ship missiles where needed. The authors suggest setting up a zone defense, with attacks starting on ships at sea with the modern version of Exocets, and moving up to pitched defenses at the end. It would not take too many missiles from Taiwan to degrade the Chinese sealift capacity sufficiently to stop any invasion.
Also, the authors are right to point out that, even if the Chinese achieve air superiority, they are still unlikely to be able to inflict the kind of air pounding that many other states have already suffered. And airpower alone is (despite what the worst-case scenario suggests to the authors) never enough to induce capitulation.
If it had been, this war would have ended a little differently...There is a great deal of mathematical and game-theoretic jargon in the piece, most of which I can't follow. But the fact that the situation has gone from "easy Taiwan wins" to "probably Taiwan can keep China out, at great cost" is a major change in the system. Granted, it's not enough to make me worry that China will invade Taiwan, but it's enough to change the calculus involved.
A bigger issue is brought up at the very end of the entire analysis. The study disputes the American ability to maintain itself as the guarantor of Taiwanese security, and it does so by striking a parallel with Cuba and the USSR. They suggest that the only reason why Cuba was able to be protected by the USSR is because it was made part of the global, nuclear confrontation, and that without doing so, the US may not be able to continue to defend Taiwan. They do not go so far as to say the US should make the Taiwan issue the beginning of a ring around China, or that the US should threaten nuclear war over any kind of attack on China, but instead say this may be the only way for the US to preserve hegemony in East Asia in general.
This part is possibly the most troubling, particularly because they devote about two paragraphs to what seems a nightmare scenario, and then drop it entirely. They fully acknolwedge that China has been peaceful up until now, and has sought to expand within the liberal international order. The very idea of starting a Cold War and containment seems absolutely ludicrous. Fortunately, they don't go that far--they instead suggest that the US help Taiwan build up an ability to survive air assault and construct an anti-amphibious assault doctrine. This involves selling them anti-ship missiles (probably like the kind we are afraid China is developing).
It also involves building up "deterrent capability" in East Asia, by hardening bases in Japan and South Korea. Unfortunately, the authors ignore all security paradox problems with this. In the end, outside of the immediate sphere of Taiwanese defense (where their ideas seem pretty logical), they are calling for a strong build-up guaranteed to worry Chinese leaders and possibly push them away from all efforts to enmesh them in the international order.
In the end, while the analysis of likely outcomes of the actual war seem solid, their recomendations beyond that seem overly pessimistic.
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