Readings Post IIIb

Today, I'm tackling the rest of the readings for this week. Those are:

Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 125-160

Andrew Erickson and Andrew Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2006.

Xu Qi, Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-First Century, Naval War College Review, Autumn 2006

Starting with Glosny: In analyzing a PRC blockade of Taiwan, I find it odd that he completely leaves the US out of the picture. It seems to be the most guaranteed way to get the US into the war, particularly if American shipping is attacked. However, I have to support his analysis of Taiwanese will. In fact, he may even understate the case--while he points out many factors that suggest that the Taiwanese would not be as willing to stand up to coercive punishment as past states, he 1) never gives even one state that has given in to coercive punishment and 2) I'm not certain of some of his analysis of "weaknesses" in Taiwanese will. In particular, I think he overstates the division within Taiwan today between those who see themselves as Chinese and those who see themselves as Taiwanese.

However, I found his restatement of the reason for "strategic ambiguity" interesting. He doesn't call it that, and again, he mostly ignores the role of the US, but he explicitly says that if Taiwan feels "safe" it might take actions that would provoke an attack by China, without being ready for it. He spends a great deal of time saying that Taiwan should be able to survive a blockade, just to add that it still shouldn't fee "safe." This leads me to a question: Is it better for Taiwan to feel safe, and possibly threaten independence, or is it better for Taiwan to feel vulnerable, and have them buy lots of extra weapons, causing the arms race to ratchet up more? (Of course, from the US perspective, the second also has the benefit of bringing money to the US.)

One other thing it shows, though, is the likely limit of a submarine-centric approach to naval power. I believe this is probably why the Chinese have spent so much money on upgrading their missile power as well, in order to have two legs to stand on. Submarines alone, while useful to Germany, were not enough. This leads to discussions on making a carrier.

Erickson: This paper focuses on Chinese plans for building/buying/retrofitting an air craft carrier of some form. The single thing I found most fascinating from this piece is the idea of an aircraft carrier as a means of building/projecting soft power. I was joking recently about a Northrop Grumman ad that billed an aircraft carrier as the "world's most effective diplomat," but apparently China has taken that to heart.

However, I still call bullshit on this being subtle or tactful.

However, I can't help but agree that, as a force projection tool, the massive aircraft carrier we usually think of still doesn't have the advantages for China that the submarine does. As the article states, they are big and easy to hit. I think it is far smarter for China to continue its quest to develop the anti-carrier missile.

On the other hand, I can see definite uses for a little helicopter carrier, if the Chinese can get their helicopter forces up to speed. Helicopters have proven very capable against pirates, something that is important for Chinese shipping through the Straits of Malacca. Also, somehow it seems that helicopters can actually benefit a submarine based Navy. I didn't quite follow how, but I'll accept it.

Moreover, as shown above, a submarine based navy will not accomplish everything the Chinese might want anyway. They need some balance to their force, which some kind of force-projection surface fleet would provide. If nothing else, since a submarine blockade of Taiwan isn't practical, and nor is an invasion, China must keep working to come up with some other way of handling a declaration of independence.

Xu Qi: This article is basically just calling for China to focus its attention and power on the maritime area. There is a repetition of old claims of American hegemonism (which are likely true) and American "encirclement" of China, at least navally. I have to agree, however, that without some care taken for protecting their naval power, they will become reliant on the US ability to police the high seas. Now, this has been a great deal for the European powers, but I know that China is not one to give up any sovereignty for any reason.